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THE CHALLENGE TO
ANTIDISCRIMINATION ENFORCEMENT
ON CAMPUS: CONSIDERATION OF AN
ACADEMIC FREEDOM PRIVILEGE
I. INTRODUCTION
Academia traditionally has been regarded as a stanchion of
American society.' Similarly, "academic freedom"'2 has been recog-
nized not only as an essential element of the nation's educational
system, but also as a means of safeguarding and maintaining the
basic structure of American society.3 Nevertheless, the judiciary
has been faced with balancing the concept of academic freedom
against the clearly enunciated ban against employment discrimina-
I Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923) (Americans "have always regarded edu-
cation and acquisition of knowledge as matters of supreme importance which should be dili-
gently promoted"); see Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (America "is
deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is of transcendent value").
2 One commentator has described academic freedom as follows:
Academic freedom consists of the absence of, or protection from, such re-
straints or pressures chiefly in the form of sanctions threatened by state or church
authorities. . ., faculties, or students of colleges and universities, but occasionally
also by other power groups in society-as are designed to create in the minds of
academic scholars (teachers, research workers, and students in colleges and uni-
versities) fears and anxieties that may inhibit them from freely studying and in-
vestigating whatever they are interested in, and from freely discussing, teaching,
or publishing whatever opinions they have reached.
Machiup, On Some Misconceptions Concerning Academic Freedom, in ACADEMIC FREEDOM
AND TENURE 178 (L. Joughin ed. 1969). According to Professor Robert MacIver.
Academic freedom is a right claimed by the accredited educator, as teacher and
investigator, to interpret his findings and to communicate his conclusions without
being subjected to any interference, molestation, or penalization because these
conclusions are unacceptable to some constituted authority within or beyond the
institution. Here is the core of the doctrine of academic freedom. It is the freedom
of the student within his field of study.
R.M. MACIVER, ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN OUR TIME 6 (1955).
' See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967). As Justice Brennan has
observed: "The Nation's future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that
robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth 'out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than
through any kind of authoritative selection."' Id. (quoting United States v. Associated
Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943)); Note, Judicial Review of the University-Stu-
dent Relationship: Expulsion and Governance, 26 STAN. L. Rzv. 95, 112 (1973) ("academic
freedom is . . . a prerequisite to educational excellence and . . . to our survival as a
civilization").
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tion embodied in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.4 In suits
by professors against universities for denial of tenure on the basis
of racial or sexual discrimination, for example, pretrial discovery
aimed at revealing the votes of faculty review committees has met
strong resistance from academics as an "intrusion" upon university
autonomy.5 They have contended that in such situations, where
the secrecy of the academic peer review system is at stake, faculty
members should be entitled to invoke an evidentiary or first
amendment qualified privilege against disclosure of their respec-
tive tenure determinations.'
Recently, two circuit courts of appeals have considered the ef-
forts of the academic community to invoke "a confidential commu-
nication" privilege in the name of academic freedom. While the
Fifth Circuit held that the creation of an academic freedom privi-
lege was not warranted, 7 the Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit determined that society's interest in protecting the peer re-
view system of a university mandated the establishment of a
qualified privilege.8 This Note initially examines the origin and na-
ture of academic freedom and the general character of the current
tenure system. This will be followed by a comparison of the ap-
proaches of the Second and Fifth Circuits with respect to the aca-
demic freedom privilege. After analyzing certain factors which
must be evaluated in determining whether the privilege should ex-
ist, the Note concludes that strong policy considerations favoring
antidiscriminatory employment practices preclude creation of an
academic freedom privilege, and endorses the rationale employed
by the Fifth Circuit in declining to embrace the privilege.
II. ACADEMIC FREEDOM
The modern concept of academic freedom evolved from the
' See Gray v. Board of Higher Educ., 692 F.2d 901, 902 (2d Cir. 1982); In re Dinnan,
661 F.2d 426, 430 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied sub nom. Dinnan v. Blaubergs, 102 S. Ct.
2904 (1982); see also Equal Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 2000-2(1) (1976).
' See, e.g., Defendants' Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Magistrate's Findings on
Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Discovery at 13, Gray v. Board of Higher Educ., 92 F.R.D. 87
(S.D.N.Y. 1981), rev'd, 692 F.2d 901 (2d Cir. 1982) (citing Developments in the
Law-Academic Freedom, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1045, 1048 (1968)).
6 See Note, Preventing Unnecessary Intrusions on University Autonomy: A Proposed
Academic Freedom Privilege, 69 CALn?. L. Rnv. 1538, 1538-39 (1981).
7 In re Dinnan, 661 F.2d 426, 427 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied sub nom. Dinnan v.
Blaubergs, 102 S. Ct. 2904 (1982).
8 Gray v. Board of Higher Educ., 692 F.2d 901, 902 (2d Cir. 1982).
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19th-century German notion of "Lehrfreiheit" or "freedom to
teach."" This special liberty, which enabled academicians to re-
search and speak without fear, was a critical prerequisite to intel-
lectual advancement in Germany's politically autocratic state.10 It
was restricted, however, in that the freedom could be exercised
only within the bounds of the university. Outside these confines,
the intellectual was subject to the same laws, rules and restrictions
as the rest of society.1
Within the United States, the theory of academic freedom was
more inclusive.' 2 First, because the United States Constitution ac-
corded all citizens the liberties traditionally enjoyed under the his-
torical notion of academic freedom, academicians sought to expand
the concept to include special safeguards for pursuits not related
to professional activities, especially in the general exercise of their
civil and political liberties.' 3 In America, therefore, one aspect of
academic freedom is concerned with the right of a professor to en-
gage in political activity unrelated to his academic specialty." In
addition, the American concept of academic freedom encompasses
the notion that the university itself is the embodiment of a collec-
tive effort to research, publish and teach,' and that "university
9 Jones, The American Concept of Academic Freedom, in ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND
TENURE, supra note 2, at 225. The German conception of academic freedom was twofold. Id.
Lehrfreiheit, or "freedom to teach," was the right of professors to teach, conduct research,
and report their research to their students without interference. Comment, Academic Free-
dom-Its Constitutional Context, 40 COLO. L. REv. 600, 600 (1968). Lernfreiheit, or "free-
dom to learn," envisioned the ability of students to roam from place to place in pursuit of
knowledge, and encompassed their right to select their own curricula. Id. This second aspect
of academic freedom generally has not been wholeheartedly embraced fn the United States.
Id.
10 See Searle, Two Concepts of Academic Freedom, in THE CONCEPT OF ACADEMIC
FREEDOM 94 (E. Pincoffs ed. 1975); Comment, supra note 9, at 600-01.
, See Metzger, The Age of the University, in R. HOFSTADTER & W. MIETZGER, THE
DEVELOPMENT OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE UNITED STATES 389 (1955).
2 See Comment, supra note 9, at 601-03.
13 See Searle, supra note 10, at 94; Van Alstyne, The Specific Theory of Academic
Freedom and the General Issue of Civil Liberty, in THE CONCEPT OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM,
supra note 10, at 62. Advocates of expanding the scope of academic freedom claim that for
educators to be truly unrestrained in their pursuit of knowledge, they require protection
greater than the constitutional protections normally afforded under the first amendment;
they not only need freedom of speech, but freedom to speak without fear of dismissal or
retribution within the academic sphere. Machlup, supra note 2, at 180.
14 Searle, supra note 10, at 90-91. See generally Machlup, supra note 2, at 191-206.
15 See American Association of University Professors, 1958 Statement of Procedural
Standards in Faculty Dismissal Proceedings, in ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND TENURE, supra
note 2, at 40-41 [hereinafter cited as AAUP].
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autonomy" is necessary for the realization of these objectives."l
The university is considered beneficial to society since it represents
not only a conduit by which essential knowledge is passed to suc-
ceeding generations, but also a tool for screening those who will
teach and for critically examining the information which they
eventually will impart.17 The well-being and independence of the
university thus are deemed essential to the well-being of society as
a whole.
The two distinct, yet overlapping, dimensions of academic
freedom-the rights of the individual academician as well as uni-
versity autonomy-have emerged in the case law.18 The first judi-
cial recognition of academic freedom came in cases which dealt
with the rights of the individual professor, and predominantly
arose in situations where state law allegedly infringed upon indi-
vidual conduct. 19 Notwithstanding this judicial recognition, how-
ever, it has been somewhat equivocal whether academic freedom
exists as a separate constitutional right or as merely a social value
embracing rights which must be balanced against other important
societal interests.20 Although in Meyer v. Nebraska,1 the Supreme
16 See id. at 3. The concept of "autonomy" rests upon the necessity for academic insti-
tutions to exert control over their affairs. See Yurko, Judicial Recognition of Academic
Collective Interests: A New Approach to Faculty Title VII Litigation, 60 B.U.L. REv. 473,
474 (1980); cf. Sterling v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich., 110 Mich. 369, 374, 68 N.W. 253,
254 (1896) (Michigan's institutions of higher learning were not successful under the control
and management of the Michigan Legislatufe). Autonomy also is an expression of academic
custom and usage, H. EDWARDS & V. NORDIN, HIGHER EDUCATION AND THE LAW 3-4 (1979),
and of the belief that only in an atmosphere of "liberty and independence" can academic
communities prosper, Greene v. Howard Univ., 271 F. Supp. 609, 615 (D.D.C. 1967). More-
over, autonomy formally may be bestowed by way of state constitutional mandate or
through designation of a public university as a public trust, see W.A. KAPLAN, THE LAW OF
HIGHER EDUCATION 368-69 (1978), or by way of legislation creating a Board of Regents to
isolate state schools from political and governmental interference, id. at 368. Regardless of
how it is attained, however, university autonomy has been viewed by the courts as a charac-
teristic worth preserving. See Greene v. Howard Univ., 271 F. Supp. at 615; Williams v.
Wheeler, 23 Cal. App. 619, 138 P. 937, 939 (Dist. Ct. App. 1913).
17 AAUP, supra note 15, at 47-48; see Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 197 (1952)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring); Finkin, Toward a Law of Academic Status, 22 BUFFALO L.
REV. 575, 587 (1973).
18 Note, supra note 6, at 1546-47.
29 See, e.g., Whitehill v. Elkins, 389 U.S. 54, 55 (1967); Keyishian v. Board of Regents,
385 U.S. 589, 591-92 (1967); Beilan v. Board of Pub. Educ., 357 U.S. 399, 400 (1958);
Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 552-53 (1956); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344
U.S. 183, 184-85 (1952); Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 491-92 (1952).
20 See generally Murphy, Academic Freedom-An Emerging Constitutional Right, 28
LAW & COrTEMP. PROBs. 447, 447-51 (1963); Comment, supra note 9, at 604-05.
21 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
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Court determined that society's interest in independent education
mandated recognition of an instructor's right to teach under the
fourteenth amendment, 22 academic freedom gradually was inter-
preted as being intertwined with the first amendment guarantees
of freedom of thought and expression.23 Moreover, Justice Frank-
furter, concurring in Sweezy v. New Hampshire,24 indicated that
the nature of academic freedom extended beyond mere concern for
the protection of first amendment rights of individual professors; it
encompassed the institution of higher learning itself. 25 Justice
Frankfurter suggested that a university be granted the freedom
"'to determine for itself on academic grounds [1] who may teach,
[2] what may be taught, [3] how it shall be taught, and [4] who
may be admitted to study.' ",26 Subsequently, in Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke,27 the Court, in examining an in-
stitution's entrance policy, referred to Justice Frankfurter's "four
freedoms," and stated that "[a]cademic freedom, though not a spe-
cifically enumerated constitutional right, has long been viewed as a
special concern of the First Amendment. '2 In Bakke, however, the
right of the university to fashion its own selection process was sub-
ject to the enforcement of individual constitutional rights.29 Thus,
academic freedom, while frequently deemed to be "of constitu-
tional significance,"30 is not accorded absolute first amendment
2 Id. at 400. Meyer involved a Nebraska statute which prohibited the teaching of any
modern foreign language to a child who had not completed grammar school. Id. at 397. A
private school teacher had been convicted of teaching German to a 10-year-old boy. Id. at
396-97. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding that the teacher's right to
teach and the right of the parents to engage him were "within the liberty of the [fourteenth]
amendment." Id. at 400.
2 See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 602-03 (1967).
24 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
2 Id. at 262-63 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). In his concurrence, Justice Frankfurter
stated:
In a university knowledge is its own end, not merely a means to an end. A
university ceases to be true to its own nature if it becomes the tool of the Church
or State or any sectional interest. . . .This implies the right to examine, question,
modify or reject traditional ideas and beliefs.
It is the business of a university to provide that atmosphere which is most
conducive to speculation, experiment and creation.
Id. (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (quoting The Open Universities in South Africa 10-12).
26 354 U.S. at 262-63 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (quoting The Open Universities in
South Africa 10-12).
2-7 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
28 Id. at 312.
28 Id. at 314.
20 Gray v. Board of Higher Educ., 92 F.R.D. 87, 91 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), rev'd, 692 F.2d 901
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protection, but rather, stands as a value to be encouraged, sup-
ported and protected only in relation to other vital interests of
society.31
III. THE COURTS AND ACADEMIC EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES
The tenure system has been described as the most effective
method through which ultimate academic freedom can be at-
tained.2 For the faculty member, tenure is the primary means of
achieving both job security and freedom from the restraints and
pressures which inhibit independent thought and action.33 The
American Association of University Professors (AAUP) recom-
mends a system under which, "[a]fter the expiration of a proba-
tionary period, [teachers or investigators] should have permanent
or continuous tenure. . . . Their service, under the AAUP
scheme, may be terminated "only for adequate cause, except in the
case of retirement for age, or under extraordinary circumstances
because of financial exigencies." 35 The AAUP also urges that
faculty have first-hand involvement in determining its own mem-
bership," and that faculty assist in the establishment, administra-
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2904 (1982).
31 Parducci v. Rutland, 316 F. Supp. 352, 355 (M.D. Ala. 1970); see Note, Academic
Freedom and Federal Regulation of University Hiring, 92 HARV. L. REV. 879, 883 (1979).
32 Jones, supra note 9, at 231. Professor Jones explained that "[tienure, or the right,
after a probationary period, to hold one's professional post continuously until age of retire-
ment, is the bulwark of academic freedom. It guarantees freedom of teaching, freedom of
research, and freedom in extramural activities." Id.
33 See Byse, Academic Freedom, Tenure, and the Law: A Comment on Worzella v.
Board of Regents, in THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF ACADEMIC TENURE 304, 305 (W. Metz-
ger ed. 1977).
34 Academic Tenure Today, in FACULTY TENURE 2 (AAUP 1973) [hereinafter cited as
Tenure Today]. The typical probationary period is between 3 and 7 years. Id. at 5.
35 American Association of University Professors, 1940 Statement of Principles on Aca-
demic Freedom and Tenure, reprinted in ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND TENURE 36-37 (L. Joughin
ed. 1969). A limited number of occurrences may constitute adequate cause for dismissal of a
tenured professor. The AAUP's 1964 statement on extramural utterances states that "[a]n
administration may file charges . . . if it feels that a faculty member['s] . . . extramural
utterances raise grave doubts concerning his fitness for his position." AAUP, supra note 15,
at 64 (citing 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure); see Bradford
v. School Dist. No. 20, 244 F. Supp. 768, 772 (E.D.S.C. 1965), aff'd, 364 F.2d 185 (4th Cir.
1966). A tenured faculty member also may be dismissed for acts of moral turpitude, Perry v.
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601 n.3 (1972); see Pettigrew, "Constitutional Tenure:" Toward ,"
a Realization of Academic Freedom, 22 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 475, 478 (1971), or for breach
of professional ethics, see Van Alstyne, supra note 13, at 74. Falsification of research or false
representations of academic investigations constitutes such a breach. See Academic Tenure
Tomorrow, in FACULTY TENURE 75 (AAUP 1973) [hereinafter cited as Tenure Tomorrow].
30 See AAUP, supra note 15, at 40-41.
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tion and enforcement of the university's tenure rules and regula-
tions."7 The decision to grant or deny tenure is arrived at through
a multi-level peer review process that is based upon the principle
that "peers" are best able to evaluate teaching ability, overall con-
tribution to scholarship, and ability to harmonize with the rest of
the academic community.3
Once tenure has been obtained, sophisticated grievance and
appeal mechanisms are available to the professor in order to en-
sure that his due process rights have not been infringed.39 The
nontenured teacher, however, does not enjoy the same rights to
procedural due process.40 Rather, a nontenured teacher easily
37 See Tenure Tomorrow, supra note 35, at 25. According to the authors of the AAUP's
1915 Declaration of Principles, "[i]t is . . . unsuitable to the dignity of a great profession
that the initial responsibility for the maintenance of its professional standards should not be
in the hands of its own members. It follows that university'teachers must be prepared to
assume this responsibility themselves." Id. at 43. Indeed, the faculties of some universities
are given virtually total control over faculty hiring, tenure, and termination. See NLRB v.
Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672, 686 n.23 (1980).
8 See Machiup, supra note 2, at 187; Tenure Tomorrow, supra note 35, at 43-44. The
AAUP recommends that the tenure decision process begin with a recommendation from the
teacher's department. Tenure Tomorrow, supra note 35, at 60. Realizing, though, that the
department may desire "doctrinal conformity" and therefore would be likely to consider
personality and other traits, the AAUP further recommends that a review mechanism be
established that would
(1) involve faculty members from outside the department and . . . not be
merely an administrative review;
(2) ensure reasonable conformity with general institutional policies and pro-
cedures, within limits of variation the institution has decided to permit;
(3) monitor [the department's professional] judgment in terms of broad pro-
fessional standards ....
Id. at 60-61. Typically, the review culminates with a recommendation to the president who,
in turn, makes his own recommendation to the Board of Trustees. Yurko, supra note 16, at
475. At each review level, the faculty is warned that they are ethically responsible to recom-
mend for tenure only those teachers who are of the highest integrity and ability. Machlup,
supra note 2, at 187.
39 See generally Joughin, Academic Due Process, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 573, 578-
98 (1963). The Joughin article advocates that an initial "informal conciliation" be held to
discuss the institution's grievances against a particular professor. Id. at 578. In addition, the
ACLU advocates that a professor be accorded a preliminary hearing at which the adminis-
tration should present him with a concise statement of the charges against him and the
university's hearing and appeal procedures. Id. at 580. The professor has the responsibility
of marshalling the evidence he intends to present and of disclosing all possible witnesses he
intends to call. Id. Gradually, the procedure becomes more adversarial in nature. See Petti-
grew, supra note 35, at 478-79. A hearing usually is held before a committee of colleagues.
Joughin, supra, at 584. The burden of proof is upon those who are bringing the charges. Id.
at 593. Additionally, an appeal procedure providing for the governing board of the college or
university to hear the controversy is recommended. Id. at 597.
40 See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573, 577 (1972); Perry v. Sindermann,
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could find himself in a situation in which the university, in its dis-
cretion, arbitrarily declines either to renew his contract, to pro-
mote him to a higher level teaching position, or to grant him ten-
ure.4' The basis for this precarious status is the aforementioned
probationary period, which allows the institution to evaluate the
teacher's instructional ability, his potential for scholastic contribu-
tion, and his compatibility with existing faculty prior to commit-
ting itself to a lifelong relationship.42
Courts have been inclined to accord universities great latitude
in formulating and implementing their policies regarding hiring,
promotion, salary, and tenure, and have been reluctant to inter-
vene when it appeared that judicial standards would displace those
of the institution.43 For instance, in Sweeny v. Board of Trustees,44
a sex discrimination suit, the court recognized "that hiring, promo-
tion, and tenure decisions require subjective evaluation most ap-'
propriately made by persons thoroughly familiar with the aca-
demic setting. ' '4 5 Notwithstanding this historical judicial aversion
to involvement with internal academic decision processes, the
courts are, for most untenured professors, the sole source of
redress.46
This dependence upon the judiciary may have contributed to
the apparent movement away from the deference traditionally ac-
corded universities.47 In a recent title VII case, Kunda v. Muhlen-
berg College,45 the Third Circuit, though stressing that academic
408 U.S. 593, 599 (1972); accord Clark v. Holmes, 474 F.2d 928, 932 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
411 U.S. 972 (1973).
41 Sartorius, Tenure and Academic Freedom, in THE CONCEPT OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM
138 (E. Pincoffs ed. 1972); cf. Davis, Academic Freedom, Academic Neutrality, and the
Social Systems, in THE CONCEPT OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM 29 (E. Pincoffs ed. 1972) (it is diffi-
cult to protect adequately the academic freedom of untenured faculty members).
42 See Joughin, supra note 39, at 594. The American Civil Liberties Union has stated:
"American educational practice permits great fluidity in the testing of [probationary] teach-
ers as to their permanent usefulness in a particular institution." Id. (quoting ACLU, AcA-
DEMIC DUE PROCESS 7-8 (1954)).
43 See, e.g., Smith v. North Carolina, 632 F.2d 316, 345 (4th Cir. 1980); Johnson v.
University of Pittsburgh, 435 F. Supp. 1328, 1353 (W.D. Pa. 1977).
44 569 F.2d 169 (1st Cir.), vacated and remanded per curiam, 439 U.S. 24 (1978), aff'd,
604 F.2d 106 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1045 (1980).
45 569 F.2d at 176.
46 See Pettigrew, supra note 35, at 484-86; Tenure Tomorrow, supra note 35, at 32-33.
The AAUP has observed that faculty's resort "to the courts testifies to the absence or fail-
ure of institutional and professional standards and procedures." Id. at 33.
4, See Note, Title VII on Campus: Judicial Review of University Employment Deci-
sions, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1206, 1216 (1982).
48 621 F.2d 532 (3d Cir. 1980).
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freedom is entitled to maximum protection,4 nonetheless stated
that it could not shirk its obligation to enforce rigorously the con-
gressional policy of remedying employment discrimination in aca-
demic institutions.5 0 Similarly, in Powell v. Syracuse University,51
the Second Circuit observed that, "far from taking an anti-in-
terventionist position with respect to the academy, the Congress
has instructed [the courts] to be particularly sensitive to evidence
of academic bias. ' 52 It is submitted that the judicial response to
the confrontation between pretrial discovery and university inde-
pendence must be measured with reference to these decisions,
since they represent the judiciary's own perception of its obligation
to provide a forum for individuals who allegedly have suffered in-
juries at the hands of academic institutions.
IV. DISCOVERY-THE ATTACK ON THE IVORY TOWER
Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes
the issuance of protective orders against "abusive," "burdensome,"
or "oppressive" discovery.53 Without considering whether an aca-
demic freedom privilege exists, courts, pursuant to their discretion-
ary authority under this provision, previously disallowed discovery
of the internal communications of educational institutions. For ex-
ample, in Keyes v. Lenoir Rhyne College,5 4 a case involving a title
VII sex discrimination suit, the college argued that the expectation
of confidentiality permitted honest and candid evaluations of
faculty members by their peers, and requested that the confidenti-
ality of the faculty evaluation records be protected under rule
26(c).55 Without resorting to any inherent privilege, the Fourth
Circuit, after declaring that the confidentiality interest of the col-
lege should be balanced against the plaintiff's need to obtain the
49 Id. at 547.
50 Id. at 551.
51 580 F.2d 1150 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 984 (1978).
52 580 F.2d at 1154.
53 FED. R. Crv. P. 26(c). Rule 26(c), which delineates the scope of discovery under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, states:
Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom discovery is sought, and
for good cause shown, the court ... may make any order which justice requires to
protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue
burden or expense, including ... : (1) that the discovery not be had ....
Id.
" 552 F.2d 579 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 904 (1977).
05 Id. at 581.
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records, concluded that the district court had not abused its dis-
cretion in finding that the interest of the college outweighed the
plaintiff's showing of need.56 The court also stated, however, that if
the college had sought to justify any male-female disparity on the
faculty on the basis of these evaluations, then the plaintiff would
have been granted access to the evaluation records in order to
demonstrate that the college's explanation was pretextual. 57
Clearly, rule 26(c) objections have been found useful by par-
ties asserting them in cases involving document discovery. In addi-
tion, they have enabled courts to evaluate the confidentiality inter-
est of universities on a case-by-case basis, without having to
determine the absolute significance of that interest. Recently, how-
ever, two discrimination cases have arisen in which discovery was
sought through the depositions of members of the faculty review
committee. The faculty members in each case refused to answer
certain questions, asserting not a discovery limitation, but rather
an academic confidentiality privilege.
In re Dinnan5s involved an action, brought pursuant to Title
VII of the Civil Rights Law and section 1983 of Title 42 of the
United States Code, in which the University of Georgia allegedly
discriminated on the basis of sex in declining to promote the plain-
tiff to the position of associate professor.59 According to the univer-
sity's established procedure, all promotion and tenure decisions
were to be made through a system of peer review, and were to be
based upon teaching ability, scholarship, and public service.6 0 Pro-
fessor Dinnan was a member of the "Promotion Review Commit-
tee" which voted to deny the plaintiff's promotion." During the
discovery stage of the proceeding, the plaintiff deposed several
'1 Id. at 580.
57 Id. at 581.
58 661 F.2d 426 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2904 (1982).
59 Id. at 431; Statement of Interested Persons at 1, In re Dinnan, 661 F.2d 426 (5th Cir.
1981). The Tenure Committee contended that their decision to deny Ms. Blaubergs' tenure
was due to her not having "done enough high-quality research." N.Y. Times, Sept. 14, 1980,
at 62, col. 1. Ms. Blaubergs believed, however, that the denial of tenure was due to her
participation in the University's women's studies program. Id.
60 Statement of Interested Persons at 2-3, In re Dinnan, 661 F.2d 426 (5th Cir. 1981).
61 661 F.2d at 427. The "Promotion Review Committee" constituted the middle tier of
a 5-level review process. Statement of Interested Persons at 3, In re Dinnan, 661 F.2d 426
(5th Cir. 1981). Their vote against granting tenure was 6 to 3. Id. A written reason for their
vote was supplied to Ms. Blaubergs. Id. An administrative appeal of their decision was en-
tered, but it subsequently was rejected. Id.
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members of the committee, 2 including Professor Dinnan, who re-
fused to disclose his position on the plaintiff's application for
promotion.6 3
The plaintiff then moved to compel discovery.14 Granting the
motion, the lower court explained that the promotion review com-
mittee may be held accountable since "there is what appears to be
a genuine question concerning the basis for what [it did]. 6 5 Never-
theless, Professor Dinnan continued to decline to respond, and was
found in contempt.6 He thereafter appealed to the Fifth Circuit,
urging recognition of an academic-freedom privilege. 7
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the invitation to
endorse the proposed privilege on "the basis of fundamental prin-
ciples of law and sound public policy."63 The Dinnan court prelim-
inarily and summarily disposed of any question that the claimed
privilege had constitutional dimensions, and held that the issue
was evidentiary, not constitutional, in nature.6 9 While acknowledg-
ing the "paramount" value placed on academic freedom by the Su-
preme Court,70 the court distinguished the prior cases as involving
attempts by the government to suppress the expression of ideas. 1
Thus, the court concluded, the reasoning employed in those deci-
sions is inapplicable to the circumstance in which a private plain-
tiff attempts to enforce his constitutional and statutory rights in
an employment discrimination suit.7 2
With respect to the establishment of a new evidentiary privi-
lege under Federal Rule 501, the court noted that privileges are
not in accord with the concept that" 'the public. . . has a right to
every man's evidence.' ",n Consequently, privileges must be con-
strued strictly and accepted only if they foster a public good which
transcends "'the normally predominant principle of utilizing all
62 Statement of Interested Persons at 3, In re Dinnan, 661 F.2d 426 (5th Cir. 1981).
03 661 F.2d at 427.
64 Id.
" Dinnan v. Blaubergs, No. 80-7441 (M.D. Ga. May 6, 1980) (order granting motion to
compel discovery).




70 Id. at 430.
71 Id.
72 Id.
7 Id. at 429.
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rational means for ascertaining truth.' ,,74 Addressing the argument
that two societal interests, academic freedom and the secret ballot
process, mandate the creation of a privilege, the court first empha-
sized that academic freedom is a circumscribed concept.7 5 Its
boundaries, according to the court, extend only to academic deci-
sions, and thus, a decision rendered on other than academic
grounds does not fall within its parameters. 6 With regard to the
damage incurred by the peer review system as a result of the fail-
ure to protect the secret ballot, the court stated that such protec-
tion has been afforded only in the context of the political process
or parallel instances. 7 Indeed, reasoned the court, members of
faculty review committees, unlike mere voters, occupy positions of
responsibility within the university such that they should be held
accountable for their decisions.7 8 The court therefore concluded
that the potential danger of a secret ballot to constitutional rights
posed "a much greater threat to our liberty and academic free-
dom" than judicially enforced discovery.70
The case of Gray v. Board of Higher Education0 presented
circumstances similar to those found in Dinnan. Following Dr. S.
Simpson Gray's nonappointment for the 1979-1980 academic year,
he filed suit under sections 1981, 1983 and 1985 of Title 42 of the
United States Code, seeking a permanent injunction against La-
Guardia Community College's alleged acts of "covert and overt"
racial discrimination.8 As in Dinnan, Doctor Gray sought to de-
pose two of the faculty members sitting on the review committee,
71 Id. at 429 (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 49 (1980)).
7" 661 F.2d at 430-31. The court, while recognizing the importance of academic free-
dom, stated that the judiciary also must realize the limit of that freedom. Id. at 431.
74 Id. at 431. The court explained that this case "precisely" presented the circum-
stances in which the judiciary should intervene. Id. (citing Kunda v. Muhlenberg College,
621 F.2d 532, 547-48 (3d Cir. 1980)).
"7 661 F.2d at 431-32. The court declared that Dinnan simply involved an "employment
decision, which by no stretch of the imagination deserves the protection that is accorded to
individual participation in the political process." Id. at 432.
78 Id.
70 Id. at 431-32.
80 692 F.2d 901 (2d Cir. 1982).
81 Id. at 902. Doctor Gray was hired in 1974 as an instructor in the Business Adminis-
tration and Management Section of the Business Division of LaGuardia Community Col-
lege. Id. The peer evaluations in his first year of teaching were satisfactory and his student
evaluations were excellent. Id. In Gray's second year, however, he received an unsatisfactory
rating and thus was placed on probation. Id. His appointment subsequently was changed to
"unconditional" after a grievance was filed. Id.
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but both refused to disclose how they voted.82 While Gray main-
tained that the content of the votes would aid him in proving bias
and would enable him to meet his burden of proof under section
1983, the university contended that the confidentiality of peer
judgments demanded a protective privilege.83
In examining the claim of privilege, the district court noted its
ability, under Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, to de-
velop rules of privilege on a case-by-case basis, and looked to Pro-
fessor Wigmore's "four fundamental conditions" to the establish-
ment of a privilege against disclosure of communications."
According to Wigmore, in order to be afforded a privilege, the com-
munications must originate in a confidence that they will not be
disclosed, "the element of confidentiality must be essential to the
full and satisfactory maintenance of the relationship between the
parties," the relationship, in the community's opinion, must be one
which should be fostered persistently, and the injury that the rela-
tion would suffer by virtue of the disclosure must be greater than
the benefit that would be gained from compelling disclosure.8 5 The
court then weighed the adverse consequences to the faculty peer
review system against the benefit that would inure to the individ-
ual litigant as a result of the disclosure."8 It was concluded that
since disclosure of the defendants' individual votes was "not the
sole avenue" by which Professor Gray could prove that his rights
had been violated, the balance tipped toward protection of the
confidentiality of the faculty peer review system.
82 Id. at 901-02. The plaintiff sought to depose Dean Moed as to his vote with respect
to the plaintiff's reappointment for the 1979-1980 academic year. Report and Recommenda-
tion of Magistrate Washington, Gray v. Board of Higher Educ., No. 79-0062, at 6 (S.D.N.Y.
April 7, 1981). As to Professor Miller, the plaintiff sought to ascertain how he voted on the
plaintiff's request for promotion to Assistant Professor, as well as his vote on the reappoint-
ment issue. Id. LaGuardia College consistently had denied the plaintiff's bids for promotion
beginning in 1977. Id. Doctor Gray suspected that Professor Miller, the Chairman of the
Accounting-Managerial Studies Department, was the guiding force behind his promotion
denial. Id.
83 See Gray v. Board of Higher Educ., 92 F.R.D. 87, 92 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), rev'd, 692 F.2d
901 (2d Cir. 1982). With respect to the university's contention, David B. Rigney, Vice Chan-
cellor for Legal Affairs, asserted that the city university's policy requires that "the 'sub-
stance or even the nature of the discussion' at meetings of college or department promotion
and budget committees be held in strict confidence by the members. It is professional mis-
conduct for a member of such a committee to reveal such information." Id. at 92.
84 Id. at 90.
85 Id. (quoting J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2285, at 531 (3d ed. 1940)).




On appeal, the Second Circuit approved the district court's
recognition of the academic freedom privilege and adopted the bal-
ancing approach employed by the district judge.8 The court, how-
ever, balanced the relevant factors differently and declined to find
the privilege applicable under the circumstances present in Gray.9
In explicating when the academic privilege should apply, the Sec-
ond Circuit adopted the AAUP's position that" '[ilf an unsuccess-
ful candidate for reappointment or tenure receives a meaningful
written statement of reasons from the peer review committee and
is afforded proper intramural guidance procedures,' disclosure of
individual faculty votes should be protected by a qualified privi-
lege.""0 The court lauded this approach as one which maintains the
appropriate balance between the Supreme Court's articulated con-
cerns for academic freedom and the individual's right to protection
from discriminatory employment practices,91 and as one which re-
flects sensitivity to the special nature of academic institutions.2
Setting forth a simple rule of thumb for invoking the privilege,
Judge Oakes stated that, "absent a statement of reasons, the bal-
ance tips toward discovery and away from recognition of privi-
lege."9' 3 After noting that an institution's compliance with AAUP
procedures will avoid the need for disclosure,94 the court indicated
that this rule would result in minimal intrusion upon academic
freedom and would not endanger the peer review system and
faculty interaction, which, according to the court, were accorded
too little weight in the Dinnan decision.9 5
The Dinnan decision stands in line with Powell and Kunda
692 F.2d at 902.
Id.
9' Id. at 907 (quoting Brief for AAUP at 23).
91 692 F.2d at 907. The court observed that the AAUP position sought to mitigate "the
confusion that can occur between the limited rights of probationary faculty members and
the due process rights guaranteed to tenured faculty." Id.
92 Id. at 907-08. The court believed that the AAUP standard preserved the distinction
between private commercial enterprises and academic institutions. Id. at 908.
93 Id. The court was under the impression that a rule of absolute disclosure would be
"in reckless disregard" of the university's need for confidentiality, while a rule of absolute
privilege would hinder prosecution of reasonable claims. Id. The court noted that under its
newly-formulated rule, past peer review decisions for which no reasons had been given
would be discoverable, but not actionable. Id.
" Id. The court anticipated that the university's compliance with the AAUP statement
would eliminate, in many cases, the need for court-ordered discovery of sensitive informa-
tion. Id. The court thus observed that most of the risk of a "chilling effect" on the peer
review system would be averted. Id.
95 Id. at 904 n.6, 908-09.
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insofar as it marks an intolerance for the use of academic freedom
as a shield against scrutiny of employment practices.96 The Gray
decision, on the other hand, maintains a cautious approach, which
is in accord with traditional judicial hesitancy to become involved
in faculty appointments.9 7 Indeed, by adopting the AAUP state-
ment, the Second Circuit has given universities an explicit process
by which they may avoid disclosure in advance."8 Presenting a ten-
ure-denied faculty member with "a detailed statement" may be
nothing more than an advance copy of a university's position paper
in preparation for litigation. 9 The following section of this Note
analyzes a number of factors which undermine this type of defer-
ential nod by the courts to academic institutions.
V. THE PROPER BALANCING APPROACH: EQUAL OPPORTUNITY VS.
AN ACADEMIC CONFIDENTIALITY PRIVILEGE
The Gray court suggested that when a university complies
with the principles and procedures of the AAUP statement, a qual-
ified peer review privilege may be invoked.100 Relying upon the
strong societal interest in preserving academic freedom, the court
stated that a policy of absolute disclosure of faculty committee
" See supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text.
9 See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
9' See 692 F.2d at 907-08. It is submitted that the rule formulated by the Second Cir-
cuit encourages the university to establish a procedure by which a written, detailed state-
ment of reasons is given upon request to a faculty member who is denied reappointment or
tenure. Although the AAUP statement recommends that the procedure include both a writ-
ten statement of reasons and the opportunity for review by a second faculty body, the court
endorsed only the requirement that a statement of reasons be given, expressing no view as
to the requirement for further review. See id. at 907 n.12. The court believed that compli-
ance with the statement of reasons procedure would obviate the need for court-compelled
discovery of faculty votes. Id. at 908. In order for universities to take advantage of this
procedure, however, it appears that a substantial change in peer review systems must be
implemented. Indeed, the Second Circuit itself noted that the City University of New York
has a fixed policy against giving such reasons. Id. at 903 n.3.
99 Id. at 908. The Second Circuit's acquiescence in the university's explanation for de-
nying tenure as that which tips the scale in favor of a privilege assumes the veracity of the
university's disclosure. More importantly, it presumes that the statement of reason would
open a sufficient path for the plaintiff to follow in presenting evidence of discrimination,
thereby obviating the need for further discovery. It is submitted that the court's approach
disregards the fact that discrimination on campus is no less insidious and subtle than it is in
other occupations or in business, and that the plaintiff may need to continue investigating
the personal latent prejudices of the decisionmaking body. See L. LEwls, ScALING THE IVORY
ToWER 13 (1975); Comment, Academic Freedom v. Title VII: Will Equal Employment Op-
portunity be Denied on Campus?, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 989, 1003-04 (1981).
100 692 F.2d at 907-08.
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votes would have a chilling effect upon the peer review process.10°
The Second Circuit thus concluded that in employment discrimi-
nation cases against universities, courts must strike a balance be-
tween discovery and privilege.10 2 It is submitted, however, that the
right to academic freedom refers only to a university's freedom to
render decisions upon academic grounds.103 When a decision is pre-
mised upon other than academic considerations, it is suggested
that the concept of academic freedom no longer may be invoked.104
The policies against racial and sexual discrimination demand judi-
cial sensitivity to the realities of educational employment, 05 and
broad discovery appears necessary to carry out the compelling soci-
etal interest in deterring discrimination in this context. Moreover,
if a plaintiff is required to bear the additional burden of facing a
privilege against disclosure of key aspects of the employment pro-
cess, any concern for the chilling effect on the peer review process
seemingly is outweighed by the concomitant adverse impact upon
antidiscrimination enforcement.10 6
A privilege is designed to protect an interest, the significance
101 Id. at 908.
102 See supra notes 86-95 and accompanying text.
'03 See In re Dinnan, 661 F.2d 426, 431 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied sub nom. Dinnan v.
Blaubergs, 102 S. Ct. 2904 (1982). The Dinnan court articulated examples of decisions made
on "other than academic grounds." Id. A pro-abortion tenure committee, for instance, might
attempt to stop the promotion of right-to-life professors. Id. The court perceived that in
such situations, the academic freedom privilege would be raised even though the underlying
decisions were not based upon academic grounds. Id.
104 Cf. Fuchs, Academic Freedom-Its Basic Philosophy, Function, and History, 28
LAw & CONTEP. PROBS. 432, 436-37 (1963) (teacher's right to academic freedom does not
extend to utterances which would serve to aid and comfort the enemy in time of war).
105 The admonition to faculty review committees against employing other than profes-
sional standards in evaluating a teacher's performance does not prevent a "coincidence of
prejudices ... [from operating] against the faculty member at every level . . . ." Van Al-
styne, supra note 13, at 75; see Machlup, supra note 2, at 185 ("[t]here is no reliable way of
separating a judgment of comparative competence and integrity from judgments of many
other personal traits, social graces, congeniality, [and] professional likemindedness") (em-
phasis in original).
'06 See Pettigrew, supra note 35, at 498, 508-09. The "chilling effect" theory apparently
fails to take into account that sanctions may be imposed for a less than conscientious evalu-
ation of a professor. To be sure, an employer may find his federal contract cancelled, termi-
nated or suspended as a result of less than full candor. Note, A Balanced Approach to
Affirmative Action Discovery in Title VII Suits, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 1013, 1028-29 (1981); see
Exec. Order No. 11,246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12,319 (1965), amended by Exec. Order No. 11,375, 32
Fed. Reg. 14,303 (1967). Similarly, federal funding may be terminated for failure to comply
with federally authorized affirmative action guidelines. Note, supra note 31, at 879-80. Thus,
it appears likely that a faculty review committee would conduct its affairs in a candid and
conscientious manner, notwithstanding its inability to claim an academic freedom privilege.
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of which outweighs the necessity for disclosure, 107 and therefore, in
measuring the value of a new privilege, it is suggested that courts
must undertake a comprehensive balancing approach, weighing the
general concern for academic confidentiality against the overall im-
portance of equal protection. s08 The remainder of this Note consid-
ers various factors which militate against the creation of an aca-
demic confidentiality privilege.
A. The Antidiscrimination Policy of the United States
Historically, an infringement upon individual rights due to un-
equal treatment was considered a breach of the fourteenth amend-
ment right to equal protection.0 9 In the context of employment,
this national policy favoring equal opportunity demands that a
person may not be refused a position on the basis of sex, race, reli-
gion or national origin, nor may terms or conditions of employment
be varied on these bases."10 Accordingly, the Civil Rights Act of
101 See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974).
lo Cf. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 710 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring) (balancing
first amendment rights against the interest in enforcement of civil and criminal statutes).
The issue before the Branzburg Court was whether the first amendment rights of freedom of
speech and press provided a privilege for newspapermen to withhold testimony when called
to appear before state or federal grand juries. Id. at 667. The facts centered around a news-
paperman's refusal to identify the source of his information. Id. at 668, 670. The Court
addressed the question whether the newspaperman could abdicate his responsibility as a
citizen to answer questions relevant to a criminal investigation, id. at 682, and held that the
first amendment does not shield the press from general obligations arising from the enforce-
ment of civil or criminal statutes, id. On this basis, the Court declined to create a first
amendment privilege precluding the discovery of confidential sources. Id. at 690.
101 The fourteenth amendment provides, in pertinent part: "No State shall... deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 1. This amendment was enacted to establish negroes as citizens of the United States.
See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 71 (1872). Its scope, however, ex-
tends to an individual's right to be free from gender discrimination as well. See Marshall v.
Kirkland, 602 F.2d 1282, 1298 (8th Cir. 1979). Furthermore, even though the fourteenth
amendment, by its terms, only covers actions by the state, that term has been expanded to
include administrative agencies of the states, Dixon v. State, 224 Ind. 327, 335, 67 N.E.2d
138, 141 (1946), municipal corporations, George v. City of Portland, 114 Or. 418, 422, 235 P.
681, 683 (1925), and public universities and colleges, Branden v. University of Pittsburgh,
392 F. Supp. 118, 124-26 (W.D. Pa. 1975), af'd, 552 F.2d 948, 963 (3d Cir. 1977). The extent
to which a university is an alter ego of the state depends upon "'[tihe degree of state con-
trol . . . . the manner in which it is founded, and whether it is separately incorporated.'"
Henry v. Texas Tech Univ., 466 F. Supp. 141, 145 (N.D. Tex. 1979) (quoting Note, Damage
Remedies Against Municipalities for Constitutional Violations, 89 HARv. L. REv. 922, 931
n.57 (1976)).
110 See Jaroch v. Board of Regents, 372 F. Supp. 106, 108 (E.D. Wis. 1974); Yurko,
supra note 16, at 535.
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1964111 provides a statutory remedy for these types of infringe-
ments.112 Although the legislature originally did not subject educa-
tional institutions to these provisions, 113 Congress in 1972 ex-
panded the scope of title VII of the Act to afford faculty members,
who were victims of discriminatory practices, meaningful access to
the courts. 114 Within this legislative scheme, the private litigant
was to be a" 'private attorneys-general,' ,,115 "vindicat[ing] the im-
portant congressional policy against discriminatory employment
practices" while proving his own injury."" This strong public pol-
icy against discrimination is reflected in the broad discretion
granted to the judiciary in title VII cases to "fashion appropriate
remedies."'11 Hence, in a manner similar to section one of the Civil
"I Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1965) (current version at
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000g (1976)).
M11 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3 (1976).
I' Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 255 (1965); see Powell v.
Syracuse Univ., 580 F.2d 1150, 1154 (2d Cir. 1978); H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.
20, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2137, 2155.
114 Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 86 Stat. 103, 104 (1973); see H.R. REP.
No. 238, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 20-21, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2137,
2154-55. In addition to expanding title VII, Congress in 1972 also enacted Title IX of the
Education Amendments Act, which prohibited sex discrimination in all phases of student
treatment, including admissions. Education Amendments Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, §
901(a), 86 Stat. 235, 373 (1973). Four months later, Congress added sex discrimination to
the jurisdiction of the United States Commission on Civil Rights. Act of Oct. 14, 1972, Pub.
L. No. 92-496, § 3, 86 Stat. 813, amending 42 U.S.C. § 1975c(a) (1957).
115 Kohn v. Royall, Koegel & Wells, 59 F.R.D. 515, 518-19 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (quoting
Jenkins v. United Gas Corp., 400 F.2d 28, 31-32 (5th Cir. 1968)), appeal dismissed, 496 F.2d
1094 (2d Cir. 1974). The term "private attorneys-general" envisions the rectification of dis-
criminatory practices by the informal efforts of laymen. 59 F.R.D. at 519 n.5. It is submitted
that this aspect of congressional intent necessitates a broad view of the permissible discov-
ery and other trial preparations to be taken by complainants. Cf. id. ("dismissal of Title VII
suits for procedural irregularities not favored").
'16 Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 45 (1974).
117 Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 763-64 (1976); see 118 CONG. REc.
7168 (1972) (statement of Sen. Williams). By its terms, title VII recognizes such injunctive
and affirmative relief as hiring, reinstatement, payment of back wages, and "any other equi-
table relief as the court deems appropriate." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976). The Supreme
Court, in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), adjudged that-
Congress did not intend by Title VII... to guarantee a job to every person
regardless of qualifications. In short, the Act does not command that any person
be hired simply because he was formerly the subject of discrimination, or because
he is a member of a minority group .... What is required by Congress is the
removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when the
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Rights Act of 1871,118 title VII is intended to permit full vindica-
tion for the infringement of civil rights.119
Implicit in the prohibition of discrimination in educational in-
stitutions is society's interest in creating within the academic com-
munity a diverse faculty and student body. Such diversity is a
source of "improved understanding and personal growth" in the
educational environment. 120 This sentiment clearly is evident in
the concern voiced by Congress that "[tjo permit discrimination
[in educational institutions] would, more than in any other area,
tend to promote misconceptions leading to future patterns of dis-
crimination." '' It thus appears that the national policy against
discriminatory practices should, in the context of the educational
system, weigh heavily against the right of a university to withhold
its employment decisions from scrutiny.121
"" Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1976)). The requirement of state involvement under the Civil Rights Act of 1871 has been
construed as equivalent to the state action prerequisite set forth in the fourteenth amend-
ment. Luria Bros. & Co. v. Allen, 452 F. Supp. 732, 736 (W.D. Pa. 1978), aff'd in part, rev'd
in part, 672 F.2d 347 (3d Cir. 1982); Poirier v. Hodges, 445 F. Supp. 838, 841-42 (M.D. Fla.
1978); supra note 109. The basic purpose of section 1983 was to provide a method of enforc-
ing the fourteenth amendment by providing citizens with a remedy for injuries suffered as a
result of unconstitutional actions. See Thompson v. New York, 487 F. Supp. 212, 226
(N.D.N.Y. 1979); Poirier v. Hodges, 445 F. Supp. 838, 842 (M.D. Fla. 1978). It also was
intended to be a rehabilitative rather than a compensatory scheme, hinging upon the hope
that legal action would induce states to abandon discriminatory practices. See Miller v.
Smith, 431 F. Supp. 821, 826-27 (N.D. Tex. 1977), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 625 F.2d 43
(5th Cir. 1980). It should be noted that substantive rights are not created by section 1983,
but rather, the rights conferred are purely remedial. Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights
Org., 441 U.S. 600, 618 (1979).
210 See Jaron, The Threat of Personal Liability Under the Federal Civil Rights Act:
Does it Interfere with the Performance of State and Local Government?, 13 URB. LAW. 1, 2
(1981).
1'2 See Regents of the University of Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 n.48 (1978)
(quoting Bowen, Admissions and the Relevance of Race, PRINCETON ALUMNI WEEKLY 7, 9
(Sept. 26, 1977)). In Bakke, the Court, quoting the president of Princeton University,
stated:
[A] great deal of learning occurs informally. It occurs through interactions among
students of both sexes; of different races, religions, and backgrounds; who come
from cities and rural areas, from various states and countries; who have a wide
variety of interests, talents, and perspectives; and who are able, directly or indi-
rectly, to learn from their differences and to stimulate one another to reexamine
even their most deeply held assumptions about themselves and their world. As a
wise graduate of ours observed. . . "People do not learn very much when they are
surrounded only by the likes of themselves."
438 U.S. at 312 n.48.
121 H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 20-21, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 2137, 2155.
122 See Kunda v. Muhlenberg College, 621 F.2d 532, 550-51 (3d Cir. 1980).
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B. Difficulty in Proving a Discrimination Suit
A number of avenues of redress are available to a person who
allegedly suffered some form of discrimination, including the four-
teenth amendment of the Constitution, l2 3 sections 1981124 and
1983125 of Title 42 of the United States Code, and the Education
Amendments to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.126 These
actions are not mutually exclusive, but rather, may be joined in a
single suit.127 The burden of proof, however, differs according to
123 See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
124 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976). Entitled "Equal Rights Under the Law," section 1981
provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same
right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be par-
ties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for
the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be
subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every
kind, and to no other.
Id.
125 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. III 1979). Section 1983 provides that a general cause of
action exists for state interference with constitutionally protected rights. See id. It specifi-
cally states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory, or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the juris-
diction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Id.
116 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000g (1976). The relevant section of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act states:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, con-
ditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, reli-
gion, sex, or national origin ....
Id. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
127 See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 459 (1975). "The legisla-
tive history of Title VII manifests" the intent of Congress to permit a person "to pursue
independently his rights under both Title VII and other applicable state and federal stat-
utes." Id. (quoting Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 48 (1974)). There are,
however, differences as to the applicability of the statutes to various types of discrimination.
Section 1981, for example, applies solely to instances of alleged racial discrimination, see
Brown v. Gaston County Dyeing Mach. Co., 457 F.2d 1377, 1384-85 (4th Cir.) (Dupree, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 982 (1972), while the scope of
section 1983 extends to allegations of unconstitutional treatment under, inter alia, the
fourth, eleventh, and fourteenth amendments of the Constitution, see, e.g., Marrero v. City
of Hialeah, 625 F.2d 499, 514 (5th Cir. 1980) (fourth amendment); Davidson v. Koerber, 454
F. Supp. 1256, 1261 (D. Md. 1978) (fourteenth amendment); Flesch v. Eastern Pa. Psychiat-
ric Inst., 434 F. Supp. 963, 977 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (eleventh amendment). Courts therefore have
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the particular theory of recovery. For instance, when the complain-
ant alleges disparate treatment under the fourteenth amendment,
the complainant is required to establish that he is a member of a
protected class, that a person with comparable attributes was
treated differently, and that the defendant acted with a discrimi-
natory intent or motive.12 8 When, however, the complainant alleges
that a statutory or administrative rule has a disparate impact, he
must show that he was deprived of equal treatment by reason of
the university's action. 1'2 9 It should be noted that the standard of
scrutiny employed by courts in determining whether a violation of
the fourteenth amendment has occurred depends upon the type of
discrimination involved. While racial classifications are considered
inherently suspect and thus subject to "strict scrutiny," gender
classifications are treated according to the lesser standard of
"heightened scrutiny.' '13 0
held that the remedies available under the various statutes, though related, nevertheless are
"separate, distinct and independent." Johnson, 421 U.S. at 461; accord Scott v. University
of Del., 601 F.2d 76, 79 n.2 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 931 (1979).
1I8 See Whiting v. Jackson State Univ., 616 F.2d 116, 122 (5th Cir. 1980). When there is
an allegation of disparate treatment, proof of discrimination invariably entails comparing
the plaintiff's qualifications with those of more successful candidates. Yurko, supra note 16,
at 533; see Faro v. New York Univ., 502 F.2d 1229, 1231-32 (2d Cir. 1974). Generally, a
plaintiff will assert that, but for the bias of the employer, he would have been chosen for the
particular position. 502 F.2d at 1231-32. In Faro, the court found that such an allegation
"would require a faculty committee charged with recommending or withholding advance-
ments or tenure appointments to subject itself to a court inquiry at the behest of unsuccess-
ful and disgruntled candidates as to why the unsuccessful was not as well qualified as the
successful." 502 F.2d at 1232.
129 Courts have recognized that, for purposes of an action brought under the fourteenth
amendment or under section 1981, 1982 or 1983, the term "State" embraces the public edu-
cational institution. See Branden v. University of Pittsburgh, 477 F.2d 1, 4-6 (3d Cir. 1973).
Furthermore, the rules, regulations and procedures employed by these institutions are
deemed quasi-statutory in character. See Rosenblum, Legal Dimensions of Tenure, in
FACULTY TENURE 161 (AAUP 1973).
,' Generally, the courts have employed a rational basis test when faced with com-
pletely nonsuspect legislation. See Allied Stores v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 527 (1959). Gender
classifications, however, are quasi-suspect and thus are given heightened scrutiny, which, to
uphold the classification, requires a finding that the classification serves important educa-
tional objectives, and that it substantially relates to the achievement of those objectives. Orr
v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 278-80, remanded, 374 So. 2d 895 (Ala.), cert. denied, 374 So. 2d 898
(Ala. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1060 (1980).
Classifications based upon race, national origin, or alien status are deemed inherently
suspect because of the history of unequal treatment of persons of minority origin. L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-24 (1978). The purpose of "strict scrutiny" is to subject
the specific government action to close inspection, so as to preserve individual equality and
autonomy. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938)
(dictum).
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In contrast to the elements which must be shown in order to
establish a violation of the fourteenth amendment, section 1983 re-
quires the complainant to prove that the university acted under
color of state law and that he was deprived of a constitutional
right.131 A claim of disparate treatment in violation of section 1983
also requires proof of intent or motive to discriminate.132 With re-
spect to suits brought under section 1981, however, it has remained
unsettled whether a finding of discriminatory intent is necessary. 133
Finally, as the Second Circuit in Gray emphasized, a title VII ac-
tion does not require actual proof of discrimination in order to
make out a prima facie case.1 34 A minimal burden is placed upon
the complainant who alleges disparate treatment to show that
(i)"he belongs to a racial minority;" (ii)"he applied and was quali-
fied for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants;"
(iii)"despite his qualifications, he was rejected;" and (iv)"after his
rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued
to seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications.1 35
Establishment of a prima facie case of disparate treatment, how-
ever, simply gives rise to an inference of discriminatory motive,1 3 6
131 Jones v. Hopper, 410 F.2d 1323, 1326-27 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 991
(1970); accord Smith v. Losee, 435 F.2d 334, 338 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 908
(1974); Taylor v. Nichols, 409 F. Supp. 927, 933-34 (D. Kan. 1976), afl'd, 558 F.2d 561 (10th
Cir. 1977).
132 See Bronze Shields, Inc. v. New Jersey Dep't of Civil Servs., 488 F. Supp. 723, 726
(D.N.J. 1980), affd in part, rev'd in part, 667 F.2d 1074 (3d Cir. 1981); Vanguard Justice
Soc'y, Inc. v. Hughes, 471 F. Supp. 670, 701-03 (D. Md. 1979).
'3 Gray v. Board of Educ., 692 F.2d 901, 905 (2d Cir. 1982).
134 Id.; see Marshall v. Kirkland, 602 F.2d 1282, 1299 (8th Cir. 1979).
185 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). Although McDonnell
Douglas involved racial discrimination, the Court's decision may be equally applicable to
instances of gender discrimination. See Johnson v. University of Pittsburgh, 435 F. Supp.
1328, 1358 (W.D. Pa. 1977). Moreover, its application to educational institutions has been
approved consistently. See, e.g., Kunda v. Muhlenberg College, 621 F.2d 532, 541-43 (3d Cir.
1980); Whiting v. Jackson State Univ., 616 F.2d 116, 120-21 (5th Cir. 1980); Jepsen v. Flor-
ida Bd. of Regents, 610 F.2d 1379, 1382-83 (5th Cir. 1980); Sweeney v. Board of Trustees,
604 F.2d 106, 108 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1045 (1980); Davis v. Weidner, 596
F.2d 726, 729-31 (7th Cir. 1979); Powell v. Syracuse Univ., 580 F.2d 1150, 1154-56 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 984 (1978).
136 Kunda v. Muhlenberg College, 621 F.2d 532, 546 (3d Cir. 1980); Flowers v. Crouch-
Walker Corp., 552 F.2d 1277, 1282 (7th Cir. 1977). The inference arising from a McDonnell
Douglas case, see supra note 135 and accompanying text, is analogous to a presumption of
fact, as it signifies that the plaintiff has produced sufficient evidence entitling him to a di-
rected verdict if the defendant fails to meet his burden of production. Flowers, 552 F.2d at
1283 n.4. The directed verdict is based upon the deduction that the employer's decision was,
"more likely than not," motivated by bias. See Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S.
567, 576 (1978). In a title VII case, motive is essential to the establishment of a disparate
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which in turn may be rebutted by the educational institution's
mere introduction of a nondiscriminatory basis for its decision. 137
Assuming there is a sufficient articulation of reason, the complain-
ant then must establish that the university's statement was merely
a pretext for discrimination.13 8
It seems clear that in title VII suits, a plaintiff most likely will
need the type of information which the academic privilege pro-
moted by the Second Circuit shields from disclosure. Furthermore,
the invocation of an academic privilege against discovery in cases
where the plaintiff is required to prove motive, intent, or pretext
would, as the Gray court itself recognized, place a difficult burden
upon the plaintiff. 39 Even in suits where discriminatory intent
need not be shown, or in which statistical evidence is relied upon,
the delicate balance of proof may well be tipped by a direct show-
ing of actual discrimination. 40 In these instances, it is abundantly
clear that detailed disclosure is necessary for a complainant to ad-
vance the remedies which so resolutely have been accorded him.'4 '
treatment claim, since the case invariably involves an accusation that the employer's une-
qual treatment stemmed from impermissible considerations. Mendez, Presumptions of Dis-
criminatory Motive in Title VII Disparate Treatment Cases, 32 STAN. L. Rav. 1129, 1129
n.3 (1980).
137 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). With respect to title
VII cases, the seminal decision defining what constitutes introduction of a nondiscrimina-
tory reason sufficient to rebut a complainant's prima facie case is Furnco Constr. Corp. v.
Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978). The standard pronounced therein is that the employer must
show merely that his employment decision was based upon a legitimate consideration. Id. at
577. The wisdom of the employer's decision is not at issue, and he need not prove absence of
discriminatory motive. Kunda v. Muhlenburg College, 621 F.2d 532, 543 (3d Cir. 1980). In
fact, "[iut is sufficient if the defendant's evidence raises a genuine issue of fact as to whether
it discriminated against the plaintiff." Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450
U.S. 248, 254-55 (1981).
138 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 805 (1973). In order to establish
pretext in either the disparate treatment or impact context, the plaintiff must show that the
employer's proffered reason for its employment decision flowed from the nature of its pur-
poses, structure, and interests, and was not unbiased. See Yurko, supra note 16, at 533.
139 692 F.2d at 905-06. It should be noted that motive, though not essential to the es-
tablishment of a prima facie title VII case, is nevertheless a critical element in proving the
employer's wrongful conduct. See, e.g., Evans v. Central Piedmont Community College, 475
F. Supp. 114, 117 (W.D.N.C. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1125 (1981).
140 692 F.2d at 905. The Gray court stated that "[c]loser examination of the elements of
Gray's case . . . makes Gray's need for the votes transparently evident." Id. The Second
Circuit further explained that the plaintiff initially would have to know the votes of the
faculty review committee in order to prove those causes of action requiring proof of discrim-
inatory intent. Id. at 906.
'4 See Waintroob, The Developing Law of Equal Employment Opportunity at the
White Collar Professional Level, 21 WM. & MARY L. REv. 45, 86 (1979); cf. Scott v. Univer-
sity of Del., 455 F. Supp. 1102, 1130 (D. Del. 1978) ("[w]hile. . .a plaintiff in a disparate-
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In addition to the difficulties arising from the various stan-
dards of proof, the victim of a discriminatory practice may find it
extremely onerous to document a charge of discrimination. Proof
of such practices is rarely direct.142 General statistics reveal little
about the motives of the department or the operation of the deci-
sionmaking process and, therefore, frequently are insufficient to
support the plaintiff's theory of recovery. 143 Indeed, absent the ex-
istence of gross disparities, courts seldom have found statistical ev-
idence sufficient to establish a prima facie case. 144 Furthermore,
educational institutions themselves often have acquired enough
data to rebut the statistical information presented by a complain-
ant in a lawsuit, 145 and the stronger the evidence offered by a de-
fendant to meet its burden of production, the more persuasive the
evidence for the complainant must be on his own rebuttal.1 46 It
impact case is entitled to rely solely on statistics, the absence of any identified victim is
nevertheless significant"), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 601 F.2d 76 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 931 (1979).
14 See Yurko, supra note 16, at 492-93. More often than not, a plaintiff must resort to
statistical indices, such as comparisons with those similarly situated, and expert testimony
in order to prove their claims of discrimination. See generally Waintroob, supra note 141, at
47.
143 See, e.g., Presseisen v. Swarthmore College, 442 F. Supp. 593, 600-01 (E.D. Pa.
1977), afl'd mem., 582 F.2d 1275 (3d Cir. 1978). Statistics come in infinite varieties. Their
relevance to a particular issue is a function of the methodology employed, the surrounding
facts and circumstances of the litigation and the comparisons being made. For example,
traditionally, general population statistics, which assume standardization of the personal
characteristics of people throughout society, were pervasively accepted by the courts. Griggs
v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971); Waintroob, supra note 141, at 69. Such statis-
tics, however, are more relevant to cases of disparate impact than to disparate treatment
because no claim of an effect on an individual is being made. Waintroob, supra note 141, at
70-75. Courts are now retreating from their endorsement of general population statistics and
are requiring that the plaintiff prove that the challenged practices have had an effect on the
plaintiff. More suited to this inquiry are indices of applicant flow, and internal statistics and
promotion ratios. Id. at 81-82.
144 Johnson v. University of Pittsburgh, 435 F. Supp. 1328, 1361 (W.D. Pa. 1977). The
statement of statistical evidence of discrimination usually leads to the need for an explana-
tion before a prima facie case will be held to have been made out. This hesitancy on the part
of the judiciary to place total confidence on statistics may arise from the absence of large
pools of similarly situated persons to sample and the subjective qualitative differences which
exist between applicants. Yurko, supra note 16, at 494.
145 See Lynn v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 656 F.2d 1337, 1345 (9th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 53 (1982).
146 A plaintiff is better able to bolster his statistical allegations of discrimination with
corroborating testimony of individual instances of discrimination. See Waintroob, supra
note 141, at 86; cf. Scott v. University of Del., 455 F. Supp. 1102, 1129-30 (D. Del. 1978),
afl'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 601 F.2d 76 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
931 (1979) (despite statistical data from which disparate impact on blacks may be inferred,
the absence of an injured individual is fatal to the action).
19831
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
therefore is submitted that judicial recognition of an academic
privilege would geometrically compound a complainant's difficulty
in obtaining essential evidence. 147
This becomes more alarming when a teacher's critical interest
in proving the true reasons for his dismissal is realized. To be sure,
those who impermissibly are denied tenure may suffer irreparable,
unjustifiable harm to their careers. 148 The difficulty in finding sub-
sequent employment within the educational system after being la-
beled academically unworthy of tenure is indeed oppressive.1 49
C. Will an Academic Confidentiality Privilege Protect a Univer-
sity's Claimed Interest?
Universities and faculty members claim that compelled dis-
closure of academic communications will have a "chilling effect"
upon candid evaluations and faculty participation in the peer re-
view process. 50 As the Dinnan court stated, however, no national,
or, for that matter, collegial interest is advanced by promoting dis-
criminatory practices.1 51 Indeed, protection of discriminatory prac-
tices serves to undermine, rather than promote, legitimate aca-
demic freedom. 152 Thus, since academic institutions are not
entitled to special protection under federal law, the doctrine of ac-
ademic freedom seemingly should not extend to all university ac-
tivities and decisions.
Notwithstanding the social benefits that may derive from the
peer review process, there appears to be no significant basis upon
which to believe that compelled disclosure significantly will temper
candor or negatively affect a good faith selection process. Never-
theless, the candor of faculty members participating in the peer
review process can be assured other than by the creation of an aca-
147 See Lynn v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 656 F.2d 1337, 1345 (9th Cir. 1981).
148 See, e.g., Johnson v. University of Pittsburgh, 359 F. Supp. 1002, 1010 (W.D. Pa.
1973).
149 Id.
110 It has been contended that there "is little likelihood that leaders in the world of
scholarship and college teaching will give us the benefit of their candid opinions of col-
leagues in their fields if they cannot be assured of confidentiality." Gray v. Board of Higher
Educ., 92 F.R.D. at 92 (quoting Affidavit of David B. Rigney, Vice Chancellor for Legal
Affairs of the City University of New York).
15 In re Dinnan, 661 F.2d at 431; Powell v. Syracuse Univ., 580 F.2d 1150, 1154 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 984 (1978); see Yurko, supra note 16, at 525-26.
15 See In re Dinnan, 661 F.2d at 431 (possibility that tenure committee decision based
upon unconstitutional grounds might be shielded from disclosure poses "a much greater
threat to our liberty and academic freedom than the compulsion of discovery").
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demic confidentiality privilege. Many governmental agencies in-
demnify their officials when judgments are rendered against them,
thereby substantially reducing any "chilling effect" upon their ac-
tivities which may be produced by the fear of litigation. 153 It is
suggested that universities may do likewise for faculty personnel
who are members of peer review committees.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Second Circuit in Gray held that the strong social interest
in protecting the confidentiality of university tenure systems re-
quires recognition of a qualified academic freedom privilege. The
Fifth Circuit's rejection of the privilege in Dinnan, however, prop-
erly emphasizes the national policy against discrimination in uni-
versities, and is more consonant with the emerging trend away
from complete deference to academic institutions. Consideration of
additional significant factors which arise in discrimination suits
supports the Fifth Circuit's conclusion that the establishment of
an academic freedom privilege is not warranted. It is hoped that
the academic confidentiality privilege will be recognized by the
courts as both unnecessary and unduly burdensome for teachers
victimized by discriminatory practices.
Joanne F. Catanese
153 Jaron, supra note 119, at 21.
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